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Según Fernández, autoatribuimos creencias sobre la base de sus fundamentos, 
“pasando por alto” (bypassing) las creencias mismas que nos atribuimos. Mi artículo argu-
menta que este procedimiento se topa con problemas normativos y metafísicos cuando 
ocurren ciertos cambios en las maneras en que el sujeto forma sus creencias. Si el cambio 
es accidental, el problema es normativo: no se puede justificar la autoatribución de la 
creencia a través del procedimiento de Bypass. El problema metafísico consiste en que no 
está claro cómo el procedimiento puede reflejar cambio alguno en la formación de creen-
cias, considerando que supuestamente sólo tome en cuenta los fundamentos (cambiantes) 
de las creencias, no las creencias mismas. 
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ABSTRACT 
According to Fernández, we self-attribute beliefs on the basis of their grounds, 
“bypassing” the beliefs to be attributed. My paper argues that this procedure runs into 
normative and metaphysical problems if certain changes in the subject’s ways of forming 
beliefs occur. If the change is accidental, the problem is normative: self-attributing the re-
sulting belief by way of Bypass cannot be justified. The metaphysical problem is that it is 
unclear how the procedure can reflect any change in belief-formation at all, given that it 
is not supposed to take into account anything but the (changing) grounds of the beliefs, 
not the beliefs themselves. 
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The purpose of this paper is to develop a specific objection to Jordi 
Fernández’s transparency account of the knowledge we have of our own 
beliefs. The objection is that the account cannot explain how we can 
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know our beliefs when our ways of forming them changes. This ampli-
fies a point made by Josep Prades in a discussion of Fernández’s book, 
Transparent Minds, that was published in Teorema, 34.1. In what follows, I 
will briefly sketch the problem Fernández aims to solve and what his 
proposed solution is. Then I shall present my objection, which has two 
parts: the first one relates to the normative side of Fernández’s account, 
the second to its metaphysical side. My conclusion will be that his theory 
is closer to a related transparency account – that of Alex Byrne (2005, 
2011) – than at first apparent. 
 
 
I. THE PROBLEM OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE, ACCORDING TO FERNÁNDEZ, 
AND HOW BYPASS IS SUPPOSED TO SOLVE IT 
 
According to Fernández, self-knowledge regarding one’s own be-
liefs1 has two important features that need to be explained, namely what 
he calls special access and strong access. We have a special access to our 
own beliefs because we do not have to rely on reasoning or on behav-
ioural evidence to know them. This makes our access special in compari-
son to the access we have to the beliefs of other people. We can only 
know their beliefs by observing their behaviour (which includes their 
verbal behaviour) and drawing our conclusion, i.e. reasoning, from what 
we observe. We can also approach our own beliefs in this way, “from the 
outside”; but normally we do not. We know them (and no-one else’s be-
liefs) in a more direct way. 
According to Fernández, we also have strong access to our own be-
liefs. Strong access is constituted by the fact that our justification for be-
lieving that we have a certain belief is normally especially strong 
compared to the justification that others can have for believing that we 
have this belief. It might be said that we are less likely to go wrong when 
our own belief is in question than when dealing with someone else’s belief. 
Again, exceptions might be possible, such as when we are self-deceived 
about a belief; but the normal case, according to Fernández, is that access 
to one’s own beliefs is better justified than that to others’ beliefs. 
The combination of special and strong access is what Fernández 
calls privileged access. The “problem of self-knowledge,” as conceived of by 
him, “is the problem of explaining how we can have privileged access to 
our mental states” [Fernández (2013), pp. 7].2 
The solution suggested by Fernández is a transparency account of 
self-knowledge regarding beliefs. Such accounts are inspired by Gareth 
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Evans’s observation that “I get myself in a position to answer the ques-
tion whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever proce-
dure I have for answering the question whether p” [Evans (1982), pp. 
225]. On this view, it is by directing our attention outwards, at the world, 
that we can find out what we believe. We do not have to introspect inner 
items in our minds. Fernández endorses this idea and explains it thus: 
Our lower-order beliefs are based on other mental states, their grounds. 
The same grounds regularly give rise to the same beliefs in us. When I 
perceive an apple in front of me, I normally form the first-order belief 
that there is an apple in front of me. Here the perception of the apple is 
the mental state which serves as grounds for the first-order belief. Now, 
given that I regularly form the same first-order belief on the same 
grounds, Fernández notes that I can also form a corresponding higher-
order belief on the basis of the same grounds, namely the belief that I have 
the first-order belief. Thus, when I perceive an apple in front of me, I can-
not only form the first-order belief that there is an apple in front of me on 
the basis of this perception, but also the higher-order belief that I believe 
that there is an apple in front of me. The perception indicates what is the 
case in the world, i.e. what I perceive, and it normally also indicates that I 
believe what I perceive. As Fernández says, it has a “double role” of 
grounding the first-order belief and the second-order belief. 
Fernández calls this procedure of forming higher-order beliefs on 
the basis of the same grounds as the lower-order beliefs self-attributed in 
them Bypass, because it is a procedure that “bypasses” the lower-order 
belief itself and instead bases the higher-order belief directly on the 
grounds of the lower-order belief. Fernández claims that we normally 
come to our higher-order beliefs through Bypass. 
Suppose that this is correct. How does Bypass help to explain the 
special and strong access we enjoy in self-knowledge regarding beliefs? 
Access to our own beliefs through Bypass is special because the pro-
cedure does not involve making any observations or inferences over and 
above those that are necessary for coming to have the lower-order belief 
attributed by way of Bypass. The subject does not have to observe herself 
or her beliefs nor does she have to draw inferences from such observa-
tions. Rather, the higher-order belief is formed directly on the same basis 
as the lower-order belief. 
Fernández points out that the resulting self-attribution of belief is 
strongly justified in so far as it does not rely on veridical perception or 
correct inferences. Of course, the truth of the lower-order belief might rely 
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on perceiving correctly or on drawing valid inferences. But the truth of 
the higher-order belief does not. Its truth depends solely on the subject 
correctly using the basis of the lower-order belief in order to attribute 
this same belief in a higher-order one. The self-attribution not depending 
on truthful perception or inferences, and therefore not being subject to 
failure in these capacities, is the reason Fernández regards it as providing 
strong access to one’s own beliefs. 
There is much more to be said about Fernández’s theory and he 
develops it with exceptional clarity, care and thoroughness. However, for 
the purposes of this article, this rough sketch of his theory about self-
knowledge regarding belief suffices. In what follows, my main question 
will be whether the Bypass procedure can cope with changes that might 
occur in our ways of forming beliefs. In such a case, will the procedure 
still produce strongly justified self-attributions of belief (the normative 
question)? And will it still be functional in the sense of producing correct 
self-attributions at all (the metaphysical question)? 
 
 
II. THE NORMATIVE FAILURE OF BYPASS WHEN OUR LOWER-ORDER 
BELIEFS ARE ACCIDENTAL 
 
Josep Prades, in his discussion of Fernández’s book, invites us to 
consider someone who sees a stick in water and comes to believe that 
the stick is straight, although it visually appears to be bent. According to 
Fernández, the subject can know through Bypass that he believes that the 
stick is straight, because he regularly forms the lower-order belief (that 
the stick is straight) given the kind of perception he has and given his 
background belief that watching a stick in water produces certain visual 
illusions. His perception and his background beliefs constitute the 
grounds on the basis of which he regularly forms his lower-order belief 
and thus can also serve as basis for ascribing the higher-order belief. 
Prades attempts to cast doubt on this application of Bypass; but I shall 
not discuss this point here. I am interested in his further complication of 
the example: “suppose that our subject is very nervous, or has taken 
some drugs, or has not slept in the last 48 hours. As a result of his 
anomalous psychological condition, he has the psychological disposition 
to trust the visual appearance of the stick, and he forms the belief that 
the stick he is seeing is bent. This would be an abnormal belief-
formation process…” [Prades (2015), pp. 113]. 
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Prades does not say so, but implies that the Bypass procedure would 
fail in such abnormal situations in the sense that it would not be able to 
provide a justification for the attribution of the lower-order beliefs. The 
resulting self-attributions of belief could not count as knowledge. This – 
Prades suggests – is implausible, as such cases do “not seem [to] involve 
a deficiency in self-knowledge at all” [cf. ibid., p. 114]. 
Prades’s case is interesting because it deals with what Fernández, in 
his response to Prades, calls a “fluke error”; that is, an error that occurs 
accidentally, not habitually. A subject might be prone to habitual errors. 
She might not know about the optical illusions caused by seeing through 
water. In consequence, she will regularly judge the stick in water to be 
bent, although in reality it is not. Similarly, a subject might regularly reason 
fallaciously. She might tend to conclude from “If p, then q” and “q” that 
p, for example. These are cases where the subject’s lower-order beliefs 
are regularly formed in a faulty way on the basis of grounds that do not 
actually justify them. (That Fernández still uses the notion of “grounds” 
in these cases shows that for him the term does not carry any normative 
connotations and is only characterised by its causal role. [Cf. Fernández 
(2013), p. 45, footnote 7.]) Beliefs based on grounds that do not justify 
are likely to be false. However, as Fernández points out, this does not 
mean that they cannot be self-attributed using the Bypass procedure. 
Since the subject regularly reasons in the fallacious way, Bypass is justified 
and the subject is justified in forming the belief that she believes that the 
stick is bent on the basis of her visual perception; or the belief that she 
believes that p on the basis of the apparent facts that “If p, then q” and 
“q”. Habitual error in the formation of lower-order beliefs does not pre-
clude strong access to them via Bypass. 
However, a fluke error in the formation of a lower-order belief is 
not a habitual error. Rather, it occurs accidentally in virtue of the special 
conditions the subject finds herself in. It is just a temporary change in 
the subject’s ways of forming beliefs. This means that there is no regular-
ity in the relation between the initial mental state and the lower-order be-
lief formed on the basis of it.3 The mental state does not tend to cause the 
belief in the subject; it does so only on this special occasion. In conse-
quence, following the Bypass procedure and self-attributing the belief on 
the basis of the mental state that irregularly caused it on this occasion is 
not justified. The justification of Bypass depends on the regularity of the 
relation between the initial mental state and the lower-order belief. Since 
there is no such regularity when the belief is the result of a fluke error, 
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the self-attribution resulting from Bypass lacks a justification. This is the 
reason why, by Fernández’s own lights, it should not count as self-
knowledge.4 
Note that the above argument can also be made by appeal to the 
occurrence of beliefs that are accidentally true. Just as in the case of fluke 
error beliefs, accidentally true beliefs are also formed irregularly, not ha-
bitually, on the basis of the states that are their grounds. In consequence, 
self-attributing them via Bypass would lack justification and the resulting 
higher-order beliefs should not count as self-knowledge. In what follows, I 
shall concentrate on the case of fluke error beliefs; but the argument can 
be run analogously for fluke true beliefs. 
Is it plausible to deny that we can have the same kind of privileged 
self-knowledge about our accidentally formed beliefs as we do about 
those that are not accidental? Why should this not be possible? If we 
think that self-knowledge about accidental lower-order beliefs should be 
possible in just the same way as self-knowledge regarding regularly 
formed beliefs, then we have to reject the Bypass theory. 
Fernández responds to this objection that we should accept “that if 
I form some first-order belief by a total fluke, then I do not qualify as 
knowing that I have that belief” [Fernández (2015), pp. 150]. This is be-
cause he thinks that the conditions must be rather “seriously abnormal 
for me to lack any sort of grounds for my first-order belief”. But “if I 
have taken drugs, or I have not slept in the last 48 hours, and I am not 
responsible for the first-order beliefs that I am forming, then what rea-
son is there to think that I will be competent in attributing beliefs to my-
self?” [Ibid.] Fernández seems to regard the conditions that bring about 
fluke errors as so out of the ordinary, and perhaps irrational, that an in-
capacity of self-knowledge might as well accompany them. 
Although Fernández’s response makes sense within the framework 
of his theory, it seems to me that it has a peculiar implication which 
might lead us to regard it as doubtful. The implication in question is that 
fluke errors and other accidental beliefs are rare phenomena that result 
from serious failures of rationality in the formation of beliefs. This im-
plication is peculiar because clearly accidental errors occur all the time in 
our daily lives. I remember that my keys are in the drawer, but in fact 
they are not. I see someone at the door, but in fact there is no-one. I cal-
culate what I will have to pay the waiter, but get the sum wrong. All 
these little accidental errors must be, for Fernández, errors that occur in 
the formation of states that ground our beliefs; not errors in the for-
mation of the beliefs themselves on the basis of whatever their grounds 
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are. They must be errors of perception, not errors in the formation of 
belief on the basis of perception; errors of memory, not errors in the 
formation of belief on the basis of memory; errors in the process of 
forming the state on the basis of which I come to believe what the sum 
is, not errors in the forming of this belief itself. For otherwise, all these 
accidental errors would be cases in which self-knowledge through Bypass 
would seem to be impossible, since there is no regularity in the coming 
about of the error. If we doubt that daily accidental error can be located 
so clearly in the process of forming mental states that ground our beliefs, 
rather than in the formation of those beliefs themselves, then the kind of 
fluke error that puts into question the justification of our self-
attributions of belief in Fernández’s theory becomes much more com-
mon than he seems to allow.5 
 
 
III. THE METAPHYSICAL FAILURE OF BYPASS: IT CANNOT 
IMMEDIATELY REFLECT CHANGES IN THE SUBJECT’S WAYS OF 
FORMING BELIEFS 
 
In the previous section we have considered the normative aspect of 
Fernández’s transparency theory: Do the deliverances of Bypass consti-
tute knowledge when the lower-order beliefs are accidentally erroneous? 
In this section I wish to consider a metaphysical aspect of the theory: Is 
Bypass capable of producing self-attributions at all (whether constituting 
knowledge or not) if the subject’s ways of forming her lower-order be-
liefs change? 
To discuss this question it is useful to reconsider the example of 
fallacious reasoning mentioned earlier: a subject regularly reasons accord-
ing to the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Given premises such as 
“q” and “If p, then q”, she regularly concludes that p. In this case, Bypass 
should provide her with knowledge that she believes that p, because the 
prior beliefs that q and that if p, then q are the grounds for her belief 
that p, i.e. they regularly cause her to believe that p. The regularity is not 
rational, but it suffices to justify the application of Bypass. Now let us 
suppose that at some point the subject stops reasoning according to this 
particular fallacy. It might be that she realises that her earlier reasoning 
was faulty. Or it might be for some other reason that she changes her 
conclusions. From now on, when she believes premises such as “q” and 
“If p, then q”, she no longer concludes that p. 
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Now my question is this: how does the subject know, on the basis 
of her beliefs that q and that if p, then q, whether or not she believes 
that p? According to Bypass, the higher-order belief “I believe that p” is 
formed exclusively on the basis of the states that ground the subject’s be-
lief that p. But while still reasoning fallaciously, the beliefs “q” and “If p, 
then q” ground (in the causal sense) the subject’s belief that p; while later 
on they no longer do so. How is the subject to know which of the two 
possibilities is the case, on the basis of the prior beliefs “q” and “If p, 
then q” alone? Nothing in the beliefs themselves indicates whether or not 
the subject uses them as grounds for forming the belief that p. If we take 
seriously the idea that higher-order beliefs are formed bypassing the lower-
order beliefs to be ascribed (and their formation processes), then there 
does not seem to be any way that the mental states prior to the lower-
order beliefs can tell the subject whether or not they ground such lower-
order beliefs. If we admit that the belief-formation might be irrational 
(though still regular), then it is possible that beliefs are formed on the ba-
sis of states that normally should have no propensity to bring them 
about. And when beliefs are formed rationally, it was still the case, prior 
to their formation, that the subject might as well not have formed them, 
but some others in an irrational way. So, it seems that the states on the 
basis of which beliefs are formed do not indicate, by themselves, wheth-
er those beliefs are formed by the subject on a given occasion, or which 
ones of them, those rationally implied or others, are formed. If this is 
correct, then Fernández’s theory fails to explain how it is possible by 
means of Bypass to arrive at correct self-attributions of belief. 
What could Fernández reply to this argument? One response could 
be to say that the subject learns from experience whether or not the By-
pass method can be used to self-attribute a belief on the basis of certain 
prior states. If the states – here: the beliefs “q” and “If p, then q” – regu-
larly lead to the belief that p, then the subject might realise that self-
attributing the belief that p, given that q and that if p, then q, normally 
leads to a truthful self-ascription of belief. And if the subject stops form-
ing beliefs according to this fallacious scheme, she might again, after a 
while, learn from experience that the self-attribution of the belief will 
now turn out false, when made on the basis of the same states as before. 
However, this view of how specific Bypass routines are formed does 
not seem very plausible. It would mean that at least in some cases the 
transparency of beliefs (i.e. that they can be accessed via Bypass) is the re-
sult of a prior third-personal access to them, because “learning from ex-
perience” what beliefs one forms in certain types of situation seems to 
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rely on some form of observing oneself as one would observe a third 
person. This view also seems to imply that we fairly often go wrong in 
our self-attributions of belief when we are still in the process of learning 
from experience what specific ways of using Bypass are correct. But such 
episodes of frequent uncertain or false self-attributions do not seem to 
exist in our lives. Another problem with this view is that it is unclear 
how general the Bypass routines that we would have to acquire can be. 
Perhaps we are more prone to affirm the consequent when specific sub-
jects are under consideration. If this were so, a distinct learning process 
would seem to be necessary for self-attributing these beliefs as opposed 
to any others. As a result, whenever new subjects and perhaps new 
forms of reasoning are under consideration, the subject would have dif-
ficulty knowing about at least some of her own beliefs because she 
would lack the experience necessary for forming correct Bypass routines. 
Again, this does not seem very plausible. It does not seem to be the case 
that we lack knowledge of what we believe just because we believe it on 
the basis of inferences that are new to us.6 
The metaphysical problem with the Bypass procedure is not restrict-
ed to self-knowledge with respect to fallaciously formed beliefs. It can al-
so be developed with respect to beliefs formed on the basis of perceptual 
states. Suppose a subject sees greenery and forms the belief that there is 
a birch tree. Let us suppose also that the subject uses an established By-
pass routine to form, on the grounds of her perceptual state (a visual ex-
perience that there is such-and-such greenery) and her classificatory 
belief (“Such-and-such greenery is a birch tree”), the higher-order belief 
that she believes that there is a birch tree. Now, there seem to be at least 
two ways in which her formation of lower-order beliefs might change 
without her Bypass procedure being able to take this into account. First, it 
might be that she does not make use of her classificatory beliefs because 
she is distracted. We might say that she does not think about what kind 
of greenery she perceives; her classificatory beliefs simply do not get in-
volved with her perceptual state. Second, it might also be that some oth-
er mental state interferes with her formation of beliefs. For some reason 
she might come to believe that she does not remember correctly what 
birch trees look like, for example. This might have the effect that, alt-
hough the classificatory belief gets activated in some way by her percep-
tual state, she still does not form the belief that there is a birch tree. The 
first case is somewhat similar to the fluke errors discussed earlier; the 
second case simply represents a situation in which the subject receives 
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new information and therefore no longer forms the same beliefs in re-
sponse to the same perceptual state as before. 
Would Fernández’s Bypass procedure be responsive to these chang-
es in the subject’s ways of forming beliefs? The subject’s perceptual state 
and her classificatory beliefs would be the same in the situation where 
she does form the belief that there is a birch tree as in the situation 
where she does not. There is nothing in these states – the compound 
state, as we might call it – to indicate whether or not the subject will 
form the belief that there is a birch tree. So how could the subject find 
out, using Bypass, whether or not she has this belief? Since Bypass is sup-
posed to base self-attributions of belief exclusively on the mental states 
grounding the belief to be attributed, not on the process of belief-
formation that might be initiated by these states, there is no clear way in 
which this procedure could reflect possible changes in the subject’s ways 
of forming beliefs. If she has learned to self-attribute the belief that there 
is a birch tree on the grounds of a certain perceptual state and her classi-
ficatory beliefs, then it seems she should continue to do so, even if on a 
given occasion the subject fails to form the belief because she is distract-
ed or because she no longer trusts her classificatory knowledge. 
Fernández would probably reply that in the first case (distraction) 
the subject is making a fluke error and that the corresponding false self-
attribution of belief might indeed occur; but this is not surprising given 
that the kind of distraction stipulated constitutes a significant impairment 
of the subject’s rationality. The problem with this reply is that it is not 
very plausible. False self-attributions of belief seem to be a very rare 
phenomenon, probably rarer than simple failures of rationality such as 
not believing anything about the classificatory details of a perceived sce-
ne despite having general classificatory knowledge at one’s disposal. 
In the second case (an interfering state of distrust), Fernández 
might respond that the subject’s perceptual state, her classificatory be-
liefs and her distrust in them, taken together, constitute a new compound 
state that normally is not apt to ground the formation of the belief that 
there is a birch tree. For this reason, the subject does not form the high-
er order belief that she believes that there is a birch tree. The problem 
with this response is, as I have tried to argue, that it is unclear how the 
subject can come to detect through Bypass whether a given compound 
state, say a perceptual state and a classificatory belief, functions as 
grounds (if there is no interfering state) or not (if there is such an inter-
fering state). Given that Bypass does not seem to take into account the 
process which leads from the grounds to the formation of the lower order 
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belief, it is hard to see how it could be responsive to such changes in the 
subject’s ways of forming beliefs on the basis of given states. 
I shall conclude by suggesting how Fernández should reply to my 
objection. I believe he should say that the Bypass procedure works be-
cause it does not only take into account the presence of states that can 
ground subsequent beliefs, but also the “pull” these states exert on the 
subject to form beliefs. In other words, the procedure must also take in-
to account at least part of the process by which the grounding states lead 
to the formation of beliefs. We might say that it must be responsive not 
only to the grounds but also to their “causal effects downstream” [Ashwell 
(2013)]. If a subject is inclined to reason fallaciously, then, on the basis of 
the fact that q and that if p, then q, it seems to her that p. If she is perceiv-
ing a birch tree, but distrusts her classificatory knowledge, then it does 
not seem to her, all things considered, that there is a birch tree.7 Bypass 
must detect such overall seemings, the “pull” that our grounding states 
exert on our belief-formation. Only such seemings can indicate in which 
way our processes of belief-formation will go. Otherwise it must remain 
mysterious how a procedure such as Bypass should be able effortlessly to 
take into account changes in our ways of forming beliefs. 
Is it problematic to modify Fernández’s theory in the manner sug-
gested? I think that it is not; rather, it makes the theory more plausible.8 
However, an interesting point to note is, I think, that when we compare 
Fernandez’s theory with other transparency theories of self-knowledge, 
the modification makes his theory rather more similar to Alex Byrne’s 
than is at first apparent. Byrne suggests that we come to know our own 
beliefs by inferring them from what we (seem to) know about the world 




I believe that p.  
 
[Byrne (2011), p. 204; Byrne adopts the schema from Gallois 
(1996), p. 46.] 
 
Without going into the details of why Byrne thinks that following this 
schema can provide one with self-knowledge, it is immediately salient 
that, on his view, we form higher-order beliefs on the basis of the beliefs 
that those higher-order beliefs are about. We form the belief “I believe 
that p” on the basis of the belief that p. On the face of it, this seems to 
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make Byrne’s account rather different from that of Fernández, because, 
according to the latter, we should bypass the lower-order belief and form 
the higher-order belief on the basis of the grounds we have for the lower-
order belief, not on the basis of this lower-order belief itself. Both ac-
counts are transparency theories in that they claim that we find out what 
we believe by directing our attention outwards at the world, rather than 
inwards at our inner mental states. But on Fernández’s view, this out-
ward attention produces mental states that serve as grounds for our lower-
order beliefs and, simultaneously, for our self-attributions of these beliefs. 
Byrne, on the other hand, claims that the outward attention produces first 
the lower-order beliefs and then, on the basis of them and by way of an in-
ference according to the doxastic schema, our higher-order beliefs. 
This sharp distinction between Fernández’s account and that of 
Byrne becomes much less pronounced with the proposed modification 
of Fernández’s theory. Now, it is no longer simply the mental state 
which grounds the subject’s lower-order belief, but also the fact that this 
state “pulls” the subject towards the formation of this belief, which 
serves as basis for forming the higher-order belief. It seems to me that 
this modification reduces considerably the difference to Byrne’s account. 
We might say that, according to Byrne, the subject (apparently9) realises or 
notes that p and consequently forms the belief that she believes that p; 
while according to Fernández, suitably modified, it seems to the subject that 
p, all things considered, and consequently she forms the belief that she be-
lieves that p. The Bypass procedure, in the modified account, seems to be 





Fernández’s transparency theory develops the ingenious idea that 
we come to know what we believe on the basis of the same mental states 
that ground those lower-order beliefs. Thus, our formation of higher-
order beliefs “bypasses” the lower-order beliefs to be attributed. There 
are two problems with Fernández’s conception of the Bypass procedure, 
which both have to do with the fact that the ways in which we come to 
our beliefs can change in time. First, there is a normative problem: self-
attributions of one’s own beliefs cannot be justified by Bypass if the be-
liefs to be attributed have been formed accidentally, i.e. not in our habit-
ual way. Second, there is a metaphysical problem: it is unclear how Bypass 
could possibly reflect changes in one’s way of forming beliefs, be they 
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accidental or real changes of mind. There is a remedy for the second 
problem: Fernández should say that we self-attribute beliefs not only on 
the basis of the mental states which are the grounds for the beliefs to be 
attributed, but also by taking into account the direction in which those 
grounds move us to form beliefs, the “pull” they exert on our belief-
formation. I have argued that this modification of Fernández’s theory 
makes it very similar to Alex Byrne’s transparency account of self-
knowledge. 
 
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México 
Circuito Maestro Mario de la Cueva s/n, Ciudad Universitaria 
C.P. 04510, Coyoacán, Ciudad de México, Mexico 
E-mail: mfcephcis@gmail.com 
 
Departamento de Humanidades y Procesos Sociales 
Escuela Nacional de Estudios Superiores, Unidad Mérida 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México 
Carretera Mérida-Tetiz Km 4.5 




This text was written while on sabbatical leave at Bielefeld University, 
Germany. I have presented earlier versions of some of the ideas at Instituto de 
Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México; Uni-
versidad de Concepción, Chile; Bielefeld University, Germany; and at conferen-
ces in San José, Costa Rica; San Cristóbal, Mexico; Munich; Villa de Leyva, 
Colombia; and Umeå, Sweden. I would like to thank the audiences on all these 
occasions for their comments and criticisms. I am especially grateful for the 
thorough discussion my paper received at the Research Seminar organized by 
Christian Nimtz at Bielefeld University. I would also like to thank Javier Vidal, 




1 Fernández makes his observation with regard to knowledge of our own 
propositional attitudes in general [cf. Fernández (2013), pp. 4ff.]. Here I shall 
concentrate on the case of belief only. 
2 Fernández does not mention this point, but it seems to me that the ur-
gency of explaining privileged access can be brought out by pointing out that, 
normally, stronger justification of empirical knowledge goes together with re-
peated observation, well-proven inference routines, back-up by theory or con-
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sultation with other experts on the matter. But all these elements of justification 
are excluded by the “specialty” of access as defined by Fernández. From this 
perspective, having only special access or only strong access to some realm of 
facts looks less problematic than having both at once. The simultaneity of both in 
the privileged access we have to our own beliefs, then, is in particular need of 
explanation. 
3 As a referee points out, saying that a state regularly brings about a belief 
might be too demanding a claim compared to saying that it reliably brings it 
about. We might say that, in the first case, we are claiming that there are several 
occasions on which the state invariably brings about a belief of this kind, while 
in the second case, the state might cause a belief of this type only once, but reli-
ably so, i.e. perhaps in such a way that this would normally happen in these cir-
cumstances. Fernández generally reserves the term “reliable” to characterise our 
capacities of perception, memory and reasoning or the testimony we depend on, 
while using “regularly” when speaking of the formation of beliefs [cf. e.g. Fer-
nández (2013), p. 65]. But it seems clear that he cannot rule out the possibility of 
self-ascribing beliefs formed only once. So, it seems that “regularly” must mean 
more for him than just “on repeated occasions”. I think this is also fairly clear 
from the fact that he describes the regularity in first-order belief-formation by 
saying that a state tends to cause a certain belief [ibid., p. 45]. He might shun the 
term “reliable” in the context of belief-formation because he rejects a function-
alist reliabilism that says that certain mental states under specific circumstances 
reliably produce beliefs to the effect that we have them. He thinks that such re-
liabilism fails to account for a sense of “cognitive achievement” associated with 
self-knowledge [cf. ibid., p. 26ff.]. The Bypass procedure is meant to preserve this 
sense by requiring that the subject concentrate on what grounds she has for her 
lower-order beliefs in order to self-attribute them [cf. ibid., pp. 62f.]. 
4 Strictly speaking, the Bypass procedure does not have application in the 
case of fluke error beliefs. This is because of the following two facts: (1) Bypass 
as defined by Fernández requires that the higher-order belief is formed on the 
basis of a mental state that constitutes grounds for the lower-order belief to be 
self-attributed [cf. Fernández (2013), p. 49]. (2) Fernández defines “mental states 
constituting grounds for some belief in a subject” as states which make it the 
case that the subject tends to have the belief when being in the state [cf. Fernán-
dez (2013), p. 45]. Clearly, in the case of fluke error the mental state on the basis 
of which the erroneous belief is formed does not tend to cause the belief. It only 
does so on this abnormal occasion. So strictly speaking, fluke error beliefs do not 
have grounds, according to Fernández, and thus there is no mental state constitut-
ing grounds for the fluke error belief on which the Bypass procedure could base 
the second-order belief. 
5 One way of questioning the rarity of accidental error in belief-formation 
is to question Fernández’s idea that we always form our lower-order beliefs on 
the basis of other mental states. Is it necessary to stipulate that there always has to 
be an intermediate state in between the world and our beliefs? Why cannot be-
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liefs be formed directly on the basis of those states of affairs in the world that 
they are about, without an intermediary state? (Belief theories of perception 
come to mind [cf. Armstrong (1968)].) If this were a common way of forming 
lower-order beliefs and if accidental error frequently occurred in such beliefs, as 
our daily experience suggests it does, then it would again be impossible to keep 
the error separate from the belief-formation and self-attributions of belief 
through Bypass (suitably reformulated) would lack justification in such cases. 
6 A second reply Fernández might give to the earlier argument is that he 
construes inferential reasoning in such a way that the problem cannot arise. His 
description of the regularity involved in inferential reasoning is this: “If S be-
lieves that Q and S believes that P follows from Q, then S comes to believe that 
P” [Fernández (2013), p. 46]. If we apply this scheme to someone reasoning ac-
cording to the fallacy of affirming the consequent we get that this subject be-
lieves that q and that if p, then q and additionally also believes that it follows 
from these facts (viz. “q” and “if p, then q”) that p. Fernández might say that in 
this description there is an element in the subject’s prior states which shows that 
she will form the belief that p, namely her additional belief that p follows from 
the other two beliefs. – I think there are three problems with this view: (i) Falla-
cious reasoning, on this view, does not seem to be really fallacious. With the ad-
ditional belief, taken as a premise, the conclusion does follow from the premises; 
the fallacy is reduced to a false premise. (ii) There is a threat of an infinite re-
gress: if in order to come to believe that P on the basis of the subject’s belief 
that Q she has to believe that P follows from Q, it seems that we are required to 
add infinitely further beliefs to the effect that P follows from the previous prem-
ises. (iii) Even if we accept Fernández’s reconstruction of fallacious reasoning, it 
is still unclear how the subject can know, on the basis of her prior beliefs, which 
are now three (“q”, “If p, then q”, “p follows from q and from the fact that if p, 
then q”) that she believes that p. Since Fernández concedes that belief-
formation can be irrational and change over time, there is no guarantee that 
these three beliefs will make the subject conclude that p, rather than something 
else or nothing at all. 
7 Fernández seems to suggest at one point that having grounds for the belief 
that p can be identified with it seeming to the subject that p [cf. Fernández (2013), 
pp. 47f.]. I have two remarks: first, although Fernández argues otherwise (ibid.), 
there is very little difference between it seeming to someone that p, all things con-
sidered, and her believing that p. Second, a given state, say a perception, might re-
sult in an overall seeming or it might not, if some other state interferes. So, it 
seems reasonable to regard the state and the seeming as distinct states.  
8 Does the modification also help Fernández reply to my first (normative) 
objection? He might say that even fluke errors are reliably based on some kind 
of overall “seeming” and that therefore the corresponding self-attributions of 
belief can also be based on it. This raises the question of why we need the state 
prior to the seemings (in unflukey situations) at all. 
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9 Realising (like noting) is a factive verb; so realising that p presupposes 
that it is true that p. Here it might be that the subject only appears to realise that 
p, because p is not the case. Byrne’s doxastic schema would still produce a cor-
rect self-ascription of belief. Byrne describes this feature of the schema by saying 
that it is “strongly self-verifying” [Byrne (2011), p. 206]. 
10 One remaining difference between Fernández and Byrne might be that 
only the former clearly assumes that all beliefs are formed on the basis of prior 
mental states such as perceptions. Although Byrne does not defend a view of 
perception such as Armstrong’s, which reduces perception to belief, he does 
think that “vision constitutively involves belief” [Byrne (2012), p. 205]. It might 
be that this idea is incompatible with Fernández’s claim that such belief is caused 
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